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ABSTRACT
The  devastation  caused  by  hurricanes  during  the  2004  and  2005  seasons  has  been
unprecedented and is forcing the insurance industry to reevaluate the role that it can play in dealing
with future natural disasters in the United States. As shown in Table 1 the four hurricanes that hit
Florida in the fall of 2004 -- Charley, Frances, Ivan and Jeanne---and Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
in 2005 comprised half of the top 12 disasters with respect to insured losses between 1970 and 2005.
On a related note, 18 of the 20 most costly disasters occurred between 1990 and 2005 and 10
occurred in the 21st Century. This context is totally different than the scale of economic loss the
country has suffered from natural disasters and other extreme events in the 20th century.
The first section of the paper addresses the first question by outlining two principles on which
a disaster insurance program should be based. Section 3 then focuses on the second question by
analyzing the insurability of a risk and examining the challenges facing the private sector in
providing coverage against natural disasters. Section 4 turns to the third question and delineates the
opportunities and challenges of a comprehensive disaster insurance program. Section 5 poses a set
of open issues that are currently being addressed by a research project on disaster insurance
undertaken by the Wharton Risk Center in conjunction with the Insurance Information Institute and
Georgia State University. The concluding section summarizes the key issues associated with
providing disaster insurance in the 21st century.
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1. Introduction  
The devastation caused by hurricanes during the 2004 and 2005 seasons has been 
unprecedented and is forcing the insurance industry to reevaluate the role that it can play 
in dealing with future natural disasters in the United States. As shown in Table 1 the four 
hurricanes that hit Florida in the fall of 2004 -- Charley, Frances, Ivan and Jeanne---and 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005 comprised half of the top 12 disasters with respect to 
insured losses between 1970 and 2005.  On a related note, 18 of the 20 most costly 
disasters occurred between 1990 and 2005 and 10 occurred in the 21
st Century.  This 
context is totally different than the scale of economic loss the country has suffered from 
natural disasters and other extreme events in the 20
th century. 
INSERT TABLE 1  
Hurricane Katrina is the most costly event the insurance industry has ever 
experienced with estimated losses likely to be more than double that of Hurricane 
Andrew. It is difficult to believe that prior to Hurricane Hugo in 1989 there was not a 
single natural disaster in the United States that cost the insurance industry $1 billion. 
(Kunreuther and Roth Jr. 1998 Chap. 1)  
The cause of these large losses is a product of several different forces. For one 
thing, there has been increased development of structures in hazard-prone areas. Data 
from the 2000 U.S. Census reveals that 53% of the U.S. population now resides along 
one of the oceans or inland coastlines. From 1970 to 2000 the southeastern Atlantic coast 
areas had an increase in population density of 66%, far exceeding the national average of 
38%. In Florida the population has increased by 535% between 1950 and 2005, up from   3
2.8 million to an estimated 17.8 million in 2005.
2  The total value of insured coastal 
exposure in the State of Florida was nearly $2 trillion at the end of 2004.  Since financial 
institutions normally require homeowners to purchase insurance coverage as a condition 
for a mortgage, the amount of insurance in force has ballooned, leading to a greater 
potential for catastrophic insured losses today than in previous years. 
There has also been an increase in hurricane activity in the North Atlantic basin. 
During the past ten years the number of hurricanes has increased by more than 60% 
relative to the low activity period between 1970-1994 and the number of category 3-5 
storms have increased by more than 150% when compared with the previous 25 year 
period  (Risk Management Solutions 2006).  The cause of this increased hurricane 
activity has been actively debated by scientists, especially during the past couple of years. 
MIT’s Kerry Emanuel, a leader in the field, has concluded that the changing pattern is 
partially due to global warming and that future warming may lead to an upward trend in 
the destructive potential of future hurricanes (Emanuel 2005).  
  An appropriately designed disaster insurance program is vital for stemming the 
tide of increasing losses from natural disasters while at the same time providing funds to 
those suffering losses. This paper addresses the following three questions that are likely 
to determine the shape of a disaster insurance program in the United States:  
•  What principles should be adhered to in developing a disaster insurance 
program?  
•  What is the appropriate balance between private and public sector 
participation in a disaster insurance program? 
                                                 
2 My thanks to Paul Amos for providing these data from the U.S. Census   4
•  Can an insurance policy that provides coverage against all natural perils be 
made  attractive to homeowners and insurers as well as policymakers at 
the local, state and federal levels?  
The next section of the paper addresses the first question by outlining two 
principles on which a disaster insurance program should be based. Section 3 then focuses 
on the second question by analyzing the insurability of a risk and examining the 
challenges facing the private sector in providing coverage against natural disasters. 
Section 4 turns to the third question and delineates the opportunities and challenges of a 
comprehensive disaster insurance program. Section 5 poses a set of open issues that are 
currently being addressed by a research project on disaster insurance undertaken by the 
Wharton Risk Center in conjunction with the Insurance Information Institute and Georgia 
State University.  The concluding section summarizes the key issues associated with 
providing disaster insurance in the 21
st century. 
  
2. Principles of a Disaster Insurance Program 
The principles on which to base a disaster insurance program can be highlighted 
by focusing on a hypothetical homeowner residing in a Gulf Coast community subject to 
damaging hurricanes:  
The Baylors have a 20 year mortgage on a home along the Gulf Coast that is 
currently valued at $200,000. The bank that issued the mortgage requires them to 
purchase a homeowners’ insurance policy. The best estimate of the annual chance 
of a severe hurricane that will cause damage to the Baylors’ house is p =1 in 100. 
If the hurricane occurs it will totally destroy the Baylor home so that the loss will 
be L=$200,000.    5
 
Principle 1: Risk-based premiums 
 Insurance premiums should reflect the underlying risk associated with the events against 
which coverage is provided. To illustrate this principle in the context of the Baylors’ home, the 
expected loss to their property from hurricanes is estimated to be pL=$2,000.   A risk-based 
premium would be $2000(1+λ), where λ is a loading factor reflecting the costs to the insurer of 
marketing a policy, assessing the risk, settling the claim if any, and making normal profits. If      
λ = .5, then a risk-based premium for the Baylors’ home would be $3000.  
Risk-based premiums provide a clear signal to individuals and businesses of the dangers 
they face when locating in hazard-prone areas and provide economic incentives to invest in cost-
effective mitigation measures. To highlight these points suppose that a state insurance regulator 
restricted rates in hurricane-prone areas so that the maximum premium that an insurer could 
charge the Baylors would be $1500. Assume the Baylors knew that the loading factor on an 
insurance policy was λ =.5, and that if a hurricane occurred in their area it would destroy their 
home. Based on the $1500 premium, the Baylors would then conclude that the chances of such a 
disaster occurring would be 1/200 rather than 1/100.
3 More generally, highly subsidized 
premiums due to rate regulation, without clear communication on the actual risk facing the 
homeowner, will encourage development of hazard-prone areas in ways that are costly to both 
the individuals who locate there as well as the rest of society who are likely to incur the costs of 
bailing out victims following the next disaster. 
There is an additional reason why insurance premiums can make individuals aware of the 
relative risks associated with locating in different areas. Empirical studies have revealed that 
individuals rarely seek out probability estimates in making their decisions, and that low 
                                                 
3 They could rationally conclude that they are getting a “great deal” on their insurance.   6
probabilities are inherently difficult to comprehend. When explicit probabilities are given to 
decision makers they often do not use the information.   [Magat, Viscusi and Huber (1987) and 
Camerer and Kunreuther (1989)].  In one study, researchers found that only 22 percent of 
subjects sought out probability information when evaluating several risky managerial decisions.  
When another group of respondents was given precise probability information, less than 20 
percent mentioned the probability in their verbal protocols. [Huber, Wider and Huber (1997)].  In 
other words, people do not deal with uncertainty in ways that would be predicted by normative 
models of choice.  
People are much more likely to pay attention to dollar expenditures when making 
location decisions. If they have comparative data on insurance premiums in different regions and 
know that these are risk-based rates, they will be able to determine the relative safety of different 
areas. In a controlled experimental study on whether individuals can distinguish between 
probabilities or insurance premiums for low probability events, Kunreuther, Novemsky and 
Kahneman (2000) found that it was necessary to present comparative information on high and 
low risk situations for people to judge how safe an area would be with respect to its risk.  
Risk-based rates also encourage investment in risk mitigation measures that are 
cost-effective. Suppose that the Baylors could reduce property damage caused by a 
hurricane by bracing their roof trusses and installing straps or clips at a cost of $1500. If 
the annual probability of a hurricane causing damage to their house is 1/100 and the 
reduction in loss due to strengthening the roof in this manner is $50,000, then the 
expected annual benefit from roof mitigation to the Baylors is $500 and a risk-based 
insurance premium with λ =.5  should be reduced by $750 [i.e.  $500(1.5)].  If the 
Baylors were offered a 20 year home improvement loan of $1500 at a 10% annual rate of 
interest to make their roof more hurricane resistant, their annual loan payment would be   7
$145.  The annual savings to the Baylors from investing in this mitigation measure would 
thus be $605. The bank will also feel that it is now better protected against a catastrophic 
loss to the property and the insurer knows that its potential loss from a major disaster is 
reduced. The general public will now be less likely to have large amounts of their tax 
dollars going for disaster relief.  This represents a win-win-win-win situation for these 
concerned stakeholders.  
Now suppose that an insurer would only be allowed to charge the Baylors $1500 for an 
insurance policy due to state regulations. Then the insurer would have no economic incentive to 
provide a premium discount for undertaking a mitigation measure. In fact, no insurer would want 
to market coverage to the Baylors or any homeowner in the hurricane-prone area with similar 
risks because in the long-run the insurer would lose money on each of these policies. More 
specifically, an insurer’s annual expected loss on the Baylors home would be greater than the 
$1500 they would be receiving in premiums.
4  
Principle 2: Affordable Insurance   
In developing an insurance program that stands any chance of being implemented it is 
necessary to recognize the tension between setting premiums that reflect risk and the financial 
ability of residents in hazard-prone areas to buy coverage. This was a major issue in the 
development of the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) in 1968.  There was great concern 
that if flood insurance rates were risk-based, then many residents in hazard-prone areas would be 
charged extremely high premiums for flood coverage and would not want to purchase it. Hence 
the program was developed with two layers---a subsidized rate for residents currently residing in 
hazard-prone areas and an actuarially based rate for those who built or substantially improved 
                                                 
4 If the insurer were forced to provide coverage to the Baylors at a premium of $1500 then they would want 
to offer a premium discount to encourage them to invest in roof mitigation since it would lower their claims 
payments following a disaster.   8
their structures after the federal government provided complete risk information in the area 
through flood insurance rate maps (Pasterick 1998). The subsidized rate was also designed to 
maintain the property values of structures in flood prone areas.
5   
There are some lessons to be learned from the experience of the NFIP that should guide 
the development of a future disaster insurance program. With subsidized rates there are no 
economic incentives for residents in hazard-prone areas to invest in mitigation measures because 
they will not be given premium discounts. Property owners that have repeatedly suffered damage 
from floods have rebuilt their property in the same location and continue to receive subsidized 
insurance rates. A recent U.S General Accountability Office (GAO) (2006)  study revealed that 
structures receiving flood insurance payments of $1000 or more over a 10 year period constitute 
less than 1 percent of the properties covered under the NFIP but involve approximately 25-30 
percent of all claims under the program.  To address this problem the Flood Insurance Reform 
Act of 2004 provides states and local communities with an additional $40 million a year for 
mitigating severe repetitive loss properties by such means as buyouts, elevation or moving the 
house (King 2006).  
Based on the experience of the NFIP, one should not provide subsidized premiums to 
those currently residing in hazard-prone areas. Rather either the State or Federal government 
should offer some type of subsidy or grant that enables low income residents to purchase 
insurance at a risk-based premium. Suppose that the Baylors had inherited their home and that 
the family’s annual income was $50,000 so that they could not afford to pay $3000 for coverage 
against damage from hurricanes. Rather than having state regulators set a maximum premium of 
$1,500 for insuring homes like the Baylors, the family could be given an insurance voucher that 
                                                 
5 The distribution of flood insurance business written in 2005 is anticipated to be 26% at subsidized rates 
and 74% at risk-based rates.  Those being charged a subsidized rate are estimated to pay between 35% and 
40% of the risk-based premium. (Hayes and Sabada 2004).   9
must be used to buy homeowners coverage.  The program could be similar in spirit to the food 
stamp program. The magnitude of the voucher would be based on the income and assets of the 
resident.  Homeowners could also be provided with subsidies or loans to invest in cost-effective 
mitigation measures and in return be charged a lower insurance premium reflecting the reduced 
damage to their structure from a future disaster.  Property owners purchasing new structures 
would pay the risk-based insurance premium no matter what is their income level.  
 
3. Providing Protection by the Private Sector: Insurability Issues 
Consider an insurer who would like to provide protection to individuals residing in 
hazard-prone areas of the United States. What factors will be important to the insurer in 
determining whether to offer coverage and if so, how much should it charge for this protection? 
These questions relate to the insurability of a risk. By insurability we mean the ability of the 
insurer to offer coverage to individuals at a price that generates sufficient demand for them to 
cover the fixed costs of developing and offering the product.   
A set of papers from researchers associated with the Wharton Risk Center have examined 
the conditions for insurability.
6  Cummins (2006) and Litan (2006) have recently examined this 
issue in the context of catastrophic risks. The discussion that follows utilizes concepts from these 
papers by focusing on a hypothetical insurer, Naturesway, who is deciding whether or not it 
wants to provide coverage to protect homeowners like the Baylors against damage to its house 
and contents from future hurricanes.  
 
 
                                                 
6 See Freeman and Kunreuther (1997)  Kunreuther and Roth  Chapter 2 (1998) and Wharton Risk Center 
(2005)   10
Law of large numbers 
Naturesway and other insurers are likely to be concerned about the variability of profits 
from the risks they insure. The ideal risk is one where the potential loss from each insured 
individual is relatively small and independent of the losses from other policyholders.  As the 
insurer increases the number of policies (n) it issues in a year, the sample mean becomes close to 
the population mean and the expected loss becomes more predictable. In other words, the law of 
large numbers implies that for large n it is highly unlikely that the insurer will suffer a loss that 
greatly exceeds the premiums collected.  
Fire is an example of a risk that satisfies the law of large numbers since losses are 
normally independent of one another.   To illustrate the application of this law, suppose that an 
insurer wants to determine the accuracy of the estimated fire loss for a group of identical homes 
valued at $100,000, each of which has a 1/1,000 annual chance of being completely destroyed by 
fire.  If one assumes that only one fire can occur to any structure during the year, the expected 
annual loss for each home would be $100 (i.e. 1/1000 x $100,000). As the number of fire 
insurance policies n increases, then the variance of the expected annual loss decreases in 
proportion to n.  Cummins (2006) considers the case where the insurer is willing to accept a low 
probability of insolvency ε arising out of a catastrophic loss when insuring a book of business. 
He shows that for risks which are independent and whose losses are characterized by the normal 
distribution so that the central limit theorem applies, the equity capital per policy approaches 
zero as the number of insured policies becomes very large. 
Conditions for Insurability  
The law of large numbers is predicated on the ability of Naturesway or other insurers to 
estimate the likelihood and consequences of a risk, and to be able to estimate that risk at a 
reasonable cost, and for the risks to be independent of each other. The risks associated with   11
large-scale natural disasters are unlikely to satisfy the law of large numbers. The following three 
conditions can then determine the degree to which such a risk is insurable: 
Condition 1 is the ability to identify and quantify, or estimate, the chances of the event 
occurring, and the extent of losses likely to be incurred when providing different levels of 
coverage.   
Condition 2 is the ability to set premiums for each potential customer or class of 
customers.  This requires some knowledge of the customer's risk in relation to others in 
the population of potential policyholders.   
Condition 3 is the generation of  sufficient demand and revenue from insuring this risk to 
cover the development, marketing and claims costs incurred by the insurer and still yield 
the firm a  positive expected profit.  
I will now examine each condition and raise some questions related to the ability 
of private insurers to provide coverage in the 21
st century.  
Condition 1: Identifying the Risk    
To satisfy this condition, estimates must be made of the frequency with which 
specific events occur and the magnitude of the loss. The fire risk is relatively easy in this 
regard since there are considerable past data available to determine the likelihood of 
damage of different magnitudes to different type structures in certain locations (e.g. 
distance from a fire hydrant).  
Due to the infrequency of natural disasters insurers have turned to scientific 
studies by scientists and structural engineers to estimate the frequency of hurricanes, 
earthquakes and floods of different magnitudes, as well as the damage that is likely to 
occur to different structures from these disasters. New advances in information 
technology have led to the development of catastrophe models (CMs) which have proven   12
very useful for quantifying the likelihood of disasters of different magnitudes and the 
resulting damage to properties as a function of the type of construction, location and 
other variables.   
  A CM combines scientific risk assessments of the hazard with historical records 
to estimate these probabilities and resulting damage.  The information can be presented in 
the form of expected annual losses and/or through exceedance probability (EP) curves 
such as the probability that in a given year Naturesway’s damage claims from hurricanes 
will exceed a certain dollar amount. CMs can also be used to calculate estimated insured 
losses from specific hypothesized events (e.g. a severe hurricane hitting downtown 
Miami and Miami Beach in 2006).  
The occurrence of Hurricane Andrew in Florida in 1992 and the 
Northridge earthquake in California in 1994 stimulated the insurance industry to 
pay more attention to output from these CMs.  Today these models are utilized by 
individual insurers and reinsurers to determine how much coverage they should 
provide, what premiums to charge, and where coverage should be offered and 
restricted to increase the firm’s profitability while reducing the probability of 
severe financial losses.
7 
During the first half of 2006 the three leading modeling firms [AIR Worldwide, 
EQECAT and Risk Management Solutions (RMS)] reevaluated their hurricane models 
based on the losses from the recent hurricanes in Florida and the rest of the Gulf Coast 
and new scientific studies. All three firms have revised their near-term models to 
                                                 
7 For a detailed analysis of the use of catastrophe models in the context of natural disasters see Grossi and 
Kunreuther (2005).    13
incorporate an increased likelihood of hurricanes in the next five years and hence higher 
expected annual losses than they had predicted in 2005.  
Condition 2: Setting Premiums for Specific Risks    
Once the risk has been identified, Naturesway and other insurers need to 
determine what premium it can charge to make a profit while not subjecting itself to an 
unacceptably high chance of insolvency or severe loss of surplus due to a catastrophic 
loss. There are several factors that determine what premiums insurers would like to 
charge if they are unregulated.  
Ambiguity of Risk  The greater the ambiguity the probability of a specific loss and the 
uncertainty of the claims payments, the higher the premium will be. In a mail survey of 
professional actuaries conducted by the Casualty Actuarial Society, 463 respondents 
indicated how much they would charge to cover losses against a defective product where 
the probabilities of a loss was well specified at p=.001 and where they experienced 
considerable uncertainty about the likelihood of a loss. The median premium values were 
five times higher for the uncertain risk than for the well-specified probability when the 
losses from each insurance policy were independent. This ratio increased to ten times 
when the losses were perfectly correlated. (Hogarth and Kunreuther 1989). 
In another study a questionnaire was mailed to 190 randomly chosen insurance 
companies of different sizes asking underwriters to specify the prices which they would 
like to charge to insure a factory against property damage from a severe earthquake, to 
insure an underground storage tank and to provide coverage for a neutral situation (i.e. a 
risk without any context).  Probabilities and losses were varied. The probability of loss 
and the size of the claim were either well-specified or there was ambiguity regarding the 
likelihood of the loss and/or the claim size. The underwriters wanted to charge   14
considerably more for the same amount of coverage when either the probability was 
ambiguous and/or the claim size was uncertain. (Kunreuther et al. 1993).
8  
Adverse Selection  If the insurer sets a premium based on the average probability of a 
loss, using the entire population as a basis for this estimate, those at the highest risk for a 
certain hazard will be the most likely to purchase coverage for that hazard.  In an extreme 
case, the poor risks will be the only purchasers of coverage, and the insurer will lose 
money on each policy sold.  This situation, referred to as adverse selection, occurs when 
the insurer cannot distinguish between the probabilities of a loss for good- and poor-risk 
categories, but the insured can. Given the development of catastrophe models and better 
scientific data on the nature of the risks facing different parts of the country it is unlikely 
that adverse selection present a major problem today for insurers providing coverage 
against damage from natural disasters.
9  
Moral Hazard   Moral hazard refers to an increase in the probability of loss caused 
by the behavior of the policyholder. For example, providing insurance protection to an 
individual may lead that person to behave more carelessly than before he or she had 
coverage.  One way to avoid the problem of moral hazard is to introduce deductibles and 
coinsurance as part of the insurance contract. A sufficiently large deductible can act as an 
incentive for the insureds to continue to behave carefully after purchasing coverage 
because they will be forced to cover a significant portion of their loss themselves. With 
                                                 
8 Risk ambiguity does not preclude insurers from issuing an insurance policy even though the premiums 
charged will be higher than if the probabilities and outcomes were well-specified. As pointed out by Jaffee 
(2006) insurance was provided for telecommunication satellites from their very first launch even though 
there was no historical data on the likelihood  that the satellite would be destroyed.    Froot and Posner 
(2002) also indicate that insurance can be provided for catastrophic events even though there is 
considerable parameter uncertainty with respect to these risks.  
9 The absence of adverse selection has been empirically demonstrated in several other insurance markets. In 
these markets the data show that there is no positive correlation between the level of risk and the quantity 
of insurance coverage. For a survey of  these studies during the past ten years  see Henriet and Michel-
Kerjan (2006).   15
coinsurance the insurer and the insured share the loss together. As with a deductible, this 
type of risk-sharing arrangement encourages safer behavior because those insured want to 
avoid having to pay for some of the losses.
10   
Even with these clauses in an insurance contract, individuals may still behave 
more carelessly with coverage simply because they are protected against a large portion 
of the loss.  For example, they may decide not to take precautionary measures that they 
would have adopted had they been uninsured.  The cost of adopting mitigation may now 
be viewed by policyholders as too high relative to the expected dollar benefits that they 
perceive  with respect to this investment.  
The other type of moral hazard problem that could exist with respect to natural 
hazards is illustrated by a decision to move unwanted furniture to the basement a day or 
two in advance of a predicted flood or hurricane to increase the likelihood that they will 
be damaged or destroyed than had they remained in their normal spots. Similarly a 
homeowner may claim cracks and other damage that existed prior to the earthquake from 
the disaster itself (ex post moral hazard).  A sufficiently large deductible might prevent 
individuals from putting contents in harms way or providing false information about the 
cause of damage from a disaster, as well as having cost advantages over other methods 
for dealing with build-up such as claims adjustment.  
Correlated Risk  Earthquakes, floods, hurricanes and other large-scale natural 
disasters produce highly correlated losses since a single event will damaged and 
destroyed many homes in the affected area. Insurers who cover the risks from such 
disasters may have to pay potentially large claims to policyholders before they are able to 
                                                 
10 For more details on deductibles and coinsurance in relation to moral hazard, see Pauly, 1968. 
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collect sufficient premiums to cover their costs. This timing risk is an important element 
associated with highly correlated risks and catastrophic losses.  [Litan (2006)]. 
To illustrate the nature of timing risk consider the decision by Naturesway as to 
how much coverage it will want to offer and what premium it will want to charge for 
damage to homes in one region of the Gulf Coast from future hurricanes. To keep the 
analysis simple assume that all the structures are identical to the Baylor home. Each 
home is valued at $200,000 and will be destroyed by a hurricane that has a probability of 
1/100 of occurring next year. Suppose Naturesway insured 100 such homes in the area at 
a risk-based premium of $3000 [i.e. (1+ λ)pL = 1.5 ($2000)] and the hurricane would 
destroy all the homes (i.e. perfect correlation).  Then Naturesway would collect $300,000 
in premiums each year but would be forced to pay out $20 million in claims should a 
damaging hurricane hit the area where the Baylors and others live. Unless Naturesway 
had considerable surplus it could become insolvent from this event. Should that be the 
case, and depending on which state it operates, part of the claims Naturesway is unable to 
pay would be reassessed against all other insurers operating in this state, as we have seen 
after the 2004 and 2005 hurricanes when several catastrophe state funds became 
technically bankrupt.  
More generally, this has been also a critical issue facing  countries when they set 
up any type of insurance pool for covering losses from catastrophic events such as natural 
disasters or terrorism. Several countries have responded by providing the pool with some 
type of temporary government backstop to cover losses should the pool not have enough 
reserves to pay claims from a major disaster. When this occurs the pool is responsible for 
reimbursing the central government after it gets back on its feet again (e.g., Pool Re in 
the UK for terrorism insurance).   17
Actuaries and underwriters both utilize heuristics that reflect this concern with 
insolvency in determining how much coverage to offer in hazard-prone areas and what 
premium to charge.   Actuaries at Naturesway will first use their best estimates of the 
likelihood of hurricanes of different intensities to determine an expected annual loss to 
the property and contents of a particular residence such as the Baylor home. Underwriters 
utilize the actuary’s recommended premium as a reference point and then focus first on 
the impact of a major disaster on the probability of insolvency or some prespecified loss 
of surplus to determine an appropriate premium to charge and the number of policies to 
market. (Kunreuther 1989).  
Roy (1952) first proposed a safety-first model to characterize this type of firm 
behavior. In the context of insurance, such a model explicitly concerns itself with 
insolvency when determining the maximum amount of coverage the insurer should offer 
and the premiums to charge. Stone (1973) formalized these concepts by suggesting that 
an underwriter who wants to determine the conditions for a specific risk to be insurable 
will first focus on keeping the probability of insolvency below some threshold level (q*). 
Let    A = the insurer’s total assets. The underwriter is considering whether to provide 
coverage for a risk at a premium z* for each policy it sells. The likelihood of a loss 
occurring is p and the magnitude of the loss is L.  Then a safety first model implies that 
the underwriter will determine the maximum number of policies m it is willing to sell so 
that 
            m 
  ∑  {Probability [jL > (A+mz*)]}< q*        (1).   
            j=1      
   18
where  q*  is a preassigned probability that reflects the insolvency  probability that the 
firm is willing to tolerate (i.e. its acceptable risk of insolvency).
11  
To illustrate the nature of a safety-first model for underwriters, suppose that 
Naturesway had a surplus of  A= $15 million  and  wanted to determine how many 
policies to write in the hazard-prone area where the Baylors locate. Suppose the risks 
were perfectly correlated and there is a probability p=1/100 of a loss of L= $200,000 to 
each house that Naturesway insured against damage from hurricanes. If Naturesway 
charged a risk-based premium of $3,000 per policy and q* < 1/100, then the underwriter 
would not want to write more than   76 policies in order to meet the solvency constraint 
given by equation (1).
12 Naturesway would only want to maintain its current book of 
business of 100 insured homes in the area if it could transfer some of the risk of a 
catastrophic loss to others through reinsurance or financial instruments such as 
catastrophe bonds.  
Rating agencies may also play a role in influencing how many policies an insurer 
will want to write on risks with respect to catastrophic losses. A recent report by AM 
Best focuses on the importance of the ratio of annual insured catastrophic losses as 
percentage of policyholder surplus (PHS). In general, the report notes that the higher the 
level of loss relative to surplus, the greater has been the financial damage to the insurance 
industry  (Williams and King 2006). 
                                                 
11   The use of a safety-first model implies that underwriters are risk averse. Greenwald and Stiglitz (1990) 
contend that managers suffer damage to their personal career prospects if their companies become insolvent 
and that they cannot diversify their risk as owners of the firm can. By this logic, underwriters would focus 
on the insolvency constraint where the owners of the firm would be less likely to do so. 
12 Since the risks are perfectly correlated for this example and q* < 1/100, the maximum number of policies  
(m*) is determined by finding the largest value of  m  where  mL <A+mz*. If  L=$200,000, A= $15 million 
and z*= $3,000   then  m* =76.    19
The AM Best report points out that insured catastrophic losses of less than 5% of 
PHS has been the norm during the 88 of the past 100 years and that the damage to the 
industry’s financial stability has been minimal. On the other hand, when insured 
catastrophic losses are between 10% and 20% of PHS,  as was the case in 1938 with the 
Great New England hurricane and in 1992 with Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki, then there 
was considerable financial stress placed on the industry.  
It is unclear how rating agencies treat the ratio of catastrophic losses/policyholder 
surplus for individual firms. In the case of the terrorism risk, insurers are concerned with 
maintaining an aggregate exposure to any terrorist attack at no more than 10 percent of its 
surplus based on concerns that they might be downgraded by rating agencies if their 
exposure/surplus ratio exceeded this percentage (Wharton Risk Center 2005). If one 
applies the same criterion to natural disasters, then an insurer would want to limit its 
coverage against catastrophic risk by reducing the number of policies that it insures 
unless it could lay off a portion of its risk through reinsurance or other risk transfer 
instruments. In the above example, if Naturesway had a surplus of $15 million it would 
only want to write 7 homeowners policies, each  for coverage of $200,000,  should the 
insurer believe that the losses were perfectly correlated and it wanted to keep its cat risk 
potential less than 10% of its surplus (i.e. below $1.5 million).   
Condition 3: Sufficient Demand for Coverage  
After examining the coverage that Naturesway believes it can offer at risk-based 
rates, the company may be convinced that it cannot offer enough policies to cover the 
fixed costs associated with developing a program for marketing coverage.  One 
alternative is to raise premiums to cover some of these costs but this would adversely 
affect demand. If there are regulatory restrictions that limit the price insurers can charge   20
for certain types of coverage, then Naturesway may not want to provide protection 
against these risks.  In addition, if Naturesway’s portfolio leaves them vulnerable to the 
possibility of extremely large losses from a given disaster due to adverse selection, moral 
hazard, and/or high correlation of risks, then it will want to reduce the number of policies 
in force for these hazards. 
To illustrate the challenges that insurers face in this regard, suppose Naturesway 
is considering marketing a new policy where the fixed costs are D dollars to develop and 
administer in addition to the marginal costs associated with marketing a policy and 
processing claims that comprise the loading factor λ.  The fixed cost D can be spread 
across the number of policies that the insurer is able to sell. To the extent that 
Naturesway is restricted in selling large numbers of policies because of the impact that a 
loss will have on its surplus, a higher premium will have to be charged  per policy sold in 
order to cover these fixed costs D.  However, the higher the premium will lower the 
demand for coverage. In other words, high values of D, coupled with a concern with 
insolvency, may make a risk uninsurable even if there are no rate regulations. It is thus 
not surprising that some insurers are reluctant to offer coverage against risks that have 
catastrophic potential, particularly after suffering losses from a major disaster that causes 
a large loss of surplus. Any restrictions on the rates that insurers can charge for coverage 
will exacerbate the problem. 
In fact, recent experience with losses from large-scale disasters suggests 
that the insurance industry will turn to the public sector for assistance. Following 
Hurricane Andrew, which caused $21.5 billion in insured losses (in 2002 prices) 
to property in the southern coast of Florida, some insurers felt that they could not 
continue to provide coverage against wind damage in hurricane-prone areas   21
within the State, especially since insurance rate regulation would prevent them 
from charging the high rates required to continue writing coverage.  This led to 
the formation of the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund that reimburses a portion 
of insurers’ losses following major hurricanes (Lecomte and Gahagan 1998).  
In the case of earthquakes, the Northridge, CA earthquake of January 1994 
caused $12.5 billion in private insured losses while stimulating considerable 
demand for coverage by residents in earthquake-prone areas of California. 
Insurers in the state stopped selling new homeowners policies because they were 
required to offer earthquake coverage to those who demanded it and were 
concerned with the possibility of suffering large losses from the next severe 
earthquake in California. This led to the formation of the California Earthquake 
Authority (CEA) in 1996 which limited the losses that insurers can suffer from a 
future earthquake (Roth, Jr. 1998). 
Given rate and coverage restrictions imposed on them, some insurers 
claim that coverage for wind damage from hurricanes and earthquake losses 
cannot be profitably marketed today in Florida and California.
13 Insurers reached 
a similar conclusion a number of years ago with respect to the flood hazard, 
which led to the development of the National Flood Insurance Program in 1968. 
 
3. Comprehensive Disaster Insurance---Advantages and Disadvantages
14 
One way to deal with issues of insurability discussed above is to have insurers provide 
coverage against all hazards in a single policy. Current insurance programs for residents in 
                                                 
13 It should be noted that most insurance companies made large profits prior to the early 1990s by 
marketing hurricane insurance in Florida and earthquake coverage in California. However, all of these 
disappeared, and more, with the occurrence of Hurricane Andrew and the Northridge earthquake. 
14  This section is based on Kunreuther (2006) and Kunreuther and Pauly (in press).    22
hazard prone areas are segmented across perils.  Standard homeowners and commercial 
insurance policies, normally required as a condition for a mortgage, cover damage from fire, 
wind, hail, lightning, winter storms and volcanic eruption. Earthquake insurance can be 
purchased for an additional premium. As noted in the introduction, flood insurance for residents 
and businesses is offered through the National Flood Insurance program, a public-private 
partnership created by Congress in 1968. 
If one is to develop a comprehensive disaster insurance policy it should adhere to the two 
principles of  risk-based rates and affordability discussed in Section 2. A comprehensive 
insurance policy with risk-based premiums is likely to come closer to meeting the conditions of 
insurability discussed in the previous section than the current program. However, it also presents 
challenges for small insurers that market policies in only a single state subject to catastrophic 
losses from natural disasters.  All insurers face the challenge of having to convince a 
policyholder living far away from any water that he or she is not being charged a premium to 
cover the losses from those at risk from flood damage.  
The idea of a comprehensive disaster insurance program where all natural disasters are 
covered by a single policy is not a new one. I proposed such a program for the United States 
many years ago in one of my first papers on the disaster insurance (Kunreuther 1968). In 1954 
Spain formed a public corporation, the Consorcio de Compensation de Seguros (CCS) that today  
provides mandatory insurance for so-called “extraordinary risks” that  include natural disasters 
and political and social events such as terrorism, riots and civil commotion. Such coverage is an 
add-on to property insurance policies that are marketed by the private sector. CCS pays claims 
only if the loss is not covered by private insurance, if low income families did not buy insurance 
and/or the insurance company fails to pay because it becomes insolvent.  The government   23
collects the premiums and private insurers market the policies and handle claims settlements 
(Freeman and Scott 2005).    
In France, a mandatory homeowners policy also covers number of different natural 
disasters along with terrorism. The main difference comes at the reinsurance level which is 
partially provided by a publicly owned reinsurer, the Caisse Centrale de Reassurance, for flood, 
earthquakes, and droughts, and by an insurance pool, Gareat, with unlimited government 
guarantee for terrorism. There is no public reinsurance for storms (Michel-Kerjan and de 
Marcellis, 2006). 
Advantages of Comprehensive Disaster Insurance 
Consider an insurer marketing homeowners coverage in different parts of the country. 
With risk-based rates it will collect premiums that reflect the earthquake risk in California, 
hurricane risk on the Gulf Coast, tornado damage in the Great Plains states and a flood risk in the 
Mississippi Valley. Each of these disaster risks is independent of the others. Using the law of 
large numbers discussed above, this higher premium base and the diversification of risk across 
many hazards reduces the likelihood that such an insurer will suffer a loss that exceeds its 
surplus in any given year for a given book of business. 
An all-hazards homeowners policy should also be attractive to both insurers and 
policyholders in hurricane-prone areas because it avoids the costly process of having an adjuster 
determine whether the damage was caused by wind or water. This problem of separating wind 
damage from water damage was a particularly challenging one following Hurricane Katrina. 
Across large portions of the coast, the only remains of buildings were foundations and steps 
where it is difficult to determine the cause of damage. In these cases insurers may decide to pay 
the coverage limits rather than incurring litigation costs to determine whether the damage came 
from water or wind.   For a house still standing, this process is somewhat easier since one knows,   24
for example,  that roof destruction is likely to be caused by the wind and water marks in the 
living room are signs of flooding (Towers Perrin 2005). 
15An all hazards policy would also deal 
with the problem that insurers currently face with respect to fire damage caused by earthquakes. 
Even if a homeowner has not purchased an earthquake insurance policy it will be able to collect 
any damages from an earthquake due to fire.  In the case of the 1906 San Francisco earthquake 
most of the damage was caused by fire and insurers were on the hook to cover these losses. In 
this sense homeowners insurance actually covers a portion of earthquake losses even though this 
coverage is excluded from the policy  
Another reason for having an insurance policy that covers all hazards is that there will be 
no ambiguity by the homeowner as to whether or not he or she has coverage. Many residing in 
the Gulf Coast believed they were covered for water damage from hurricanes when purchasing 
their homeowners policies.  In fact, lawsuits were filed in Mississippi and Louisiana following 
Katrina claiming that homeowners policies should provide protection against water damage even 
though there are explicit clauses in the contract that excludes these losses (Hood 2005).  
The attractiveness of insurance that guarantees that the policyholder will have coverage 
against all losses from disasters independent of cause has also been demonstrated experimentally 
by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). They showed that 80 percent of their subjects preferred such 
coverage to what they termed probabilistic insurance where there was some chance that a loss 
was not covered.  What matters to an individual is the knowledge that he or she will be covered 
if her property is damaged or destroyed, not the cause of the loss. Such a policy has added 
benefits to the extent that individuals are unaware that they are not covered against rising water 
or earthquake damage in their current homeowners policy.  
                                                 
15 If the insurance company is to set risk based premia, they may still need to unbundle the risk to build an 
experience data base, as pointed out to me by Tom Russell.   25
Another advantage of a comprehensive homeowners program is that it may address some 
of the issues that currently plague the National Flood Insurance Program. As noted in a recent 
GAO report (2006) only half of the properties eligible for flood insurance are covered by it. 
Furthermore there were a number of properties suffering water damage from Hurricane Katrina 
that were not eligible to purchase flood insurance under the NFIP.  Those who did have flood 
insurance and suffered large losses from the rising waters were only able to cover a portion of 
their losses because the maximum coverage limit for flood insurance under the NFIP is $250,000 
on building property and $100,000 on personal property (Hartwig and Wilkinson 2005). 
Naturally, an all-hazards insurance policy will be more expensive than the standard 
homeowners policy because it is more comprehensive. If premiums are based on risk then 
policyholders would only be charged for hazards that they face. Thus a homeowner in the Gulf 
Coast would theoretically be covered for earthquake damage but would not be charged anything 
for this additional protection if the area in which they reside is not a seismically active area. In 
promoting this all-risk coverage one needs to highlight this point to the general public who may 
otherwise feel that they are paying for risks that they do not face. 
Disadvantages of Comprehensive Disaster Insurance  
The major disadvantage of a comprehensive disaster insurance program with risk-based 
rates is that it will force state regulators to allow insurers to raise their rates to raise their rates to 
cover the potential damage in hazard-prone areas.  For example, in Florida insurance rates along 
the coast subject to hurricanes are currently well below the actuarially fair premium.(Grace, 
Klein and Kleindorfer 2004). If insurance commissioners allow companies to charge a rate that 
reflects the risk many individuals will be forced to pay premiums that are considerably higher 
than what they are currently charged. Many are likely to complain that this is highly unfair and 
unanticipated.    26
A large increase in premium will be viewed by homeowners as unjustified and there will 
be significant resistance to paying for this coverage. For high income residents who have second 
homes on the coast there is an economic rationale for them to pay the cost of their insurance. A 
step in this direction was recently discussed by the Florida legislature indicating that homes 
valued at over $2 million would have to be turned down by three surplus lines carriers (whose 
rates are not regulated) before they could turn to the state fund for coverage. For lower income 
residents there needs to be an insurance subsidy from the state or federal government (as 
discussed in Section 2) so that these homeowners can afford to purchase coverage.  
Many insurers are likely to resist a comprehensive disaster insurance program because 
they may fear the possibility of even larger losses than they have suffered to date and because 
their current efforts may not be geared towards underwriting and marketing all perils policies. 
Some note that if both wind and water damage were to be included in a homeowners policies the 
losses from Hurricane Katrina to private insurers would be considerably higher.  In order for 
insurers to feel comfortable with such a program they would have to be able to protect 
themselves against catastrophic losses either through  private risk transfer instruments (e.g. 
reinsurance, catastrophe bonds), State funds or federal reinsurance.  
There will also be special needs facing small companies operating in a single state who 
have smaller surplus than larger firms and are limited in their ability to diversify their risk. These 
insurers may find that the variance in their losses increases by incorporating the flood and 
earthquake risks as part of a homeowners policy. For example, a Louisiana insurance company 
providing protection against hurricane damage might find the variance in losses to be higher than 
it is today if both wind and water damage were covered under a homeowners policy. For these 
companies to compete with larger firms they would have to be able to protect themselves against 
catastrophic losses through either private or public-based risk transfer instruments that would not   27
price them out of the market. Remark: Dwight has a recent paper on single line insurers which 
may be relevant to this issue. 
These smaller firms need to be differentiated from single-state subsidiaries established by 
some national insurer groups to help the parent company maintain or establish a high financial 
rating. The parent company has the option to disown itself from this single state subsidiary 
should it suffer a catastrophic loss (Grace, Klein and Liu 2006). There needs to be some 
protection given to the policyholders in this case should the single-state subsidiary declare itself 
to be insolvent. 
Insurers who market a comprehensive disaster insurance policy face an additional 
challenge in trying to convince homeowners that they are only paying for risks that they actually 
face. One way for them to do this is to itemize the cost of different types of coverage on the 
policy itself in much the way current homeowners or automobile insurance breaks up the cost for 
different types of protection. If the Baylor family knew that it would be paying $3,000 for wind 
coverage, $1500 for water coverage, $500 for fire coverage and $0 for earthquake coverage, it 
would not complain about covering damage from seismic risk facing California homeowners.  
Such an itemized list of coverage would also highlight the magnitude of risks that the Baylors 
faced by living in their home, another role that insurance can play----a signal as to how 
hazardous a particular place is likely to be.  Whether or not this information will convince 
consumers that it is worth purchasing all-perils coverage is an open question. If the price is very 
high individuals will resist purchasing a policy voluntarily even if they know it is based on risk.  
 
4.  Open Issues for Future Research  
There are a number of issues that need to be examined in order to determine whether a 
comprehensive disaster insurance program has a chance of being implemented, whether an   28
alternative disaster insurance program is more appropriate or whether one should maintain the 
status quo. A program of research is now being undertaken by the Wharton Risk Management 
and Decision Processes Center in conjunction with the Insurance Information Institute and 
Georgia State University that will be exploring these issues.  
Mandatory vs. Voluntary Insurance 
Should all property owners be required by the federal or state government to have 
insurance coverage against natural disasters?  Today, banks normally require homeowners and/or 
commercial insurance as a condition for a mortgage. There will be some individuals who either 
own their house outright or are not required by their bank to purchase insurance.  One of the 
open questions where we need better data are the number of uninsured homes  in hazard prone 
areas and the income distribution of those individuals who reside in them. If there are a 
significant number of uninsured individuals, many of whom are in the middle and low income 
brackets, the federal government is likely to provide financial 
16assistance following the next 
large-scale disaster. If the disaster occurs at a critical time in the political process it is almost 
certainty that liberal relief will be forthcoming. One only has to look back at earlier disasters, 
such as the Alaskan earthquake of March 1964 and Tropical Storm Agnes of June 1972 that 
occurred during a Presidential election year, to remind oneself of the type of aid the Federal 
government is capable of giving. In both disasters there were low interest loans and forgiveness 
grants that actually resulted in individuals being financial better off after the disaster than before 
the event. Moss (2002) documents the nature of government assistance for both natural disasters 
and other risks.  
If the prevailing view is that those residing in hazard-prone areas should be responsible 
for covering their own losses then a mandatory insurance program would be appropriate. Many 
                                                 
16 For more details on the disaster assistance program following these two disasters see  Kunreuther (1973).   29
states require automobile insurance as a condition for driving Disaster insurance could be treated 
in a similar fashion by including the premium as part of a person’s property tax assessment. To 
the extent that individuals misperceive the amount of assistance they will receive following a 
disaster, requiring insurance may be viewed by them as a blessing should these individuals suffer 
losses from a disaster. Following Hurricane Katrina uninsured victims complained about not 
receiving more disaster assistance. They may not have known that under the Stafford Act, the 
maximum amount of assistance to any individual or household for repairing damaged property is 
$25,000 (FEMA 2006). Although the Small Business Administration (SBA) offers loans of up to 
$200,000 for repairs to damaged primary residences,  low income residents may not eligible for 
them because of their inability to repay the loan.  
Tax Write-offs for Uninsured Losses 
One factor that needs to be considered when examining whether or not to make insurance 
mandatory are the income tax provisions with respect to uninsured losses. At the federal level 
homeowners who have losses from a disaster that exceed 10% of their income can deduct this 
loss when filing their taxes.
17 Homeowners in a high tax bracket who are not required to 
purchase insurance because they don’t have a mortgage may determine that it makes economic 
sense to be uninsured and use the tax write-off provision to cover a significant portion of their 
losses following a major disaster (Kaplow 1992).  Some states may also have similar provisions 
in their tax codes which would provide additional savings to these uninsured victims by reduced 
state income tax payments.  
 
 
                                                 
17 More details on write-off provisions on federal income tax can be found at 
http://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc515.html 
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Mitigating Losses from Natural Disasters 
To reduce losses from future disasters property owners need to protect themselves by 
investing in cost-effective mitigation measures. The importance of well-enforced building codes 
coupled with appropriate land use regulations cannot be overemphasized in this regard.  These 
measures are likely to be controversial since they limit economic development and growth in 
hazard-prone areas and thus reduce the tax base for the State, and may increase housing costs.
18   
The construction and real estate sectors have traditionally opposed measures that increase the 
price of a structure so that one needs to provide appropriate economic incentives for undertaking 
these measures. Long-term loans tied to a mortgage for mitigating a structure coupled with 
reduced insurance premiums are one way to make these measures financially attractive. The 
example provided in Section 2 where the Baylors were far better off financially by investing in 
roof shutters illustrates this point. 
Providing Affordable Coverage      
One of the principles guiding any disaster insurance program is that insurance premiums 
reflect the risk. State insurance departments need to give insurers freedom to charge these rates 
subject to solvency regulations that prevent undercapitalized insurers from charging unduly low 
premiums with the intent of declaring bankruptcy should a catastrophic disaster occur. A key 
challenge facing the states and federal government would be how to provide affordable coverage 
and deal with the political fallout that will undoubtedly occur when insurance rates are increased 
from their current levels. This is a major political problem and needs to be discussed openly with 
the concerned stakeholders. When presenting this issue one needs to highlight the importance of 
risk-based rates for encouraging property owners to invest in cost-effective mitigation measures 
                                                 
18 See  Listokin and  Hattis ( 2005) for more detail on the impact that building codes have had on housing 
costs.    31
and the savings that will emerge from a reduced disaster assistance program following a 
catastrophic event. 
Protecting Insurers against Catastrophic Losses 
One of the reasons that some insurers are now withdrawing coverage from areas that are 
subject to large-scale losses is because they are concerned with the impact that a disaster will 
have on their surplus should it occur in the next few years.  As shown with the illustrative 
example of  the Naturesway insurance company, the premiums that an insurer collects in any 
given year on its homeowners policy will only pay a fraction of the claims should a large number 
of their insured properties suffer severe damage from a disaster. 
An important issue that needs to be examined carefully is whether the private sector has 
the ability to provide sufficient coverage against catastrophic losses or whether one needs to rely 
on some type of public sector involvement at the State and/or federal level for financial 
protection should a large-scale hurricane or earthquake occur. There have been a number of 
recent papers that have addressed this issue in the context of natural disasters that suggest a 
variety of different ways to address the problem.
19   There is general agreement that one should 
do everything one can to rely on the private sector to provide insurance protection but that there 
may be capacity limitations which require public sector involvement. 
In order to address this issue one needs to have a clearer understanding of the availability 
of risk transfer mechanisms, such as reinsurance and catastrophe bonds, and their costs to 
insurers relative to public sector options such as state catastrophe funds and federal reinsurance. 
Given the need for short-term funds to help replenish surplus following a disaster there may be a 
role that federal loans can play as noted by Jaffee and Russell (2006) or some type of  
                                                 
19 See  Cummins (2006), Grace, Klein and Liu  (2006),  Harrington (2006),  Jaffee and Russell (2006),  and 
Kunreuther (2006).    32
reinsurance contracts auctioned by the federal government as proposed by Lewis and Murdock 
(1997). The federal government does have an easier time raising money in times of disaster than 
does the private sector and has a comparative advantage in this sense. On the other hand, the 
private insurance industry has had long-term experience in marketing coverage and paying 
claims needs to be taken into account when evaluating alternative disaster insurance programs.  
 
5. Summary and Conclusions  
This paper proposes that we examine the feasibility of including earthquake and water 
damage as part of a global homeowners policy for dealing with the catastrophic risk problem 
from natural disasters. By undertaking such an analysis one is forced to address the question as 
to who should pay for disasters and how can we encourage individuals to undertake protective 
measures in advance of the event. 
Two key principles underlying any disaster insurance program is that the rates reflect the 
risk and that coverage is affordable. For lower income individuals it will be impossible to satisfy 
the first principle without some type of subsidy from the public sector. There are also a set of 
questions as to whether the private sector has the ability to cover losses from catastrophic 
disasters on their own or will need some type of public sector involvement.  
There are a set of related issues that have to be considered when developing any type of 
disaster insurance program. These include the ability to assess the risk and the uncertainty of the 
models, the appropriate role of regulation, balancing the concerns of the different stakeholders 
concerned with this issue and the types of subsidies and back-up provision that can be offered by 
the public sector. Finally we need a clear understanding of the political and social landscape as 
well as how choices are actually made so as to develop a disaster insurance program as part of a 
hazard management strategy that achieve its desired impacts. The challenges in this regard are   33
quite different today than they were in the 20
th century because of the magnitude of losses from 
these disasters in the past few years.  
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4
The 20 Most Costly Catastrophe Insurance Losses, 1970-2005
(18 of them occurred between 1990 and 2005; 10 of them occurred in the last 5 years)
USA 2001 41 Tropical Storm Alison 3.4 20
Japan, South Korea 2004 45 Typhon Songda 3.6 19
USA, Caribbean et al 2004 3,034 Hurricane Jeanne 4.0 18
USA, Caribbean 1998 600 Hurricane Georges 4.1 17
Japan 1999 26 Typhoon Bart 4.6 16
Western/Central Europe 1990 64 Winterstorm Vivian 4.6 15
France, UK et al 1987 22 Storms and floods 5.0 14
Indonesia, Thailand et al 2004 280,000 Seaquake, Tsunami 5.0 13
USA, Bahamas 2004 38 Hurricane Frances 5.0 12
USA 2005 119 Hurricane Rita 4-7* 11
Puerto Rico, USA et al 1989 71 Hurricane Hugo 6.4 10
France, Switzerland et al 1999 110 Winterstorm Lothar 6.6 9
France, UK et al 1990 95 Winterstorm Daria 6.7 8
Japan 1991 51 Typhoon Mireille 7.80 7
USA, Caribbean et all 2004 24 Hurricane Charley 8.00 6
USA, Caribbean et al 2004 124 Hurricane Ivan 11.00 5
USA 1994 61 Northridge Quake 17.80 4
USA, Bahamas 1992 43 Hurricane Andrew 21.50 3
USA 2001 3,025 9/11 Attacks  32.4 2
USA 2005 1,281* Hurricane Katrina 40-55 1
Country Year
Victims
(Dead and missing)
Event
U.S.$ Billion
(indexed to 2004)
Rank
Sources: Wharton Risk Center with data from Swiss Re, Insurance Information Institute and press releases (*estimations)
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